The twilight zone of myth-and-literature studies by Virágos K., Zsolt
Z S O L T K. V I R Á G O S 
T H E T W I L I G H T Z O N E O F M Y T H - A N D - L I T E R A T U R E 
STUDIES: A N A L O G Y , A N O M A L Y , A N D 
I N T E R T E X T U A L I T Y 
Cadmus slays the Dragon and makes Thebes a prosperous city. 
Oedipus "kills" the Sphinx and the Thebans welcome him as their 
king. Perseus kills the Gorgon Medusa (as well as the sea-monster), 
acquires Andromeda and becomes king of Tiryns. Bellerophon kills 
the Chimaera, becomes a great hero and wins the daughter of Iobates. 
Heracles destroys several monsters, including the Hydra and the 
monstrous lion, and after accomplishing the twelve gigantic labors 
burns himself to death. St. George kills the Dragon and saves a city— 
and a maiden—in distress. 
The analogies are irresistible. All these mythological culture 
heroes—as well as a profusion of protagonists in the folklore residues 
of almost every culture, including Hungarian folktales—evoke the 
monster-killing/heroic-rescue paradigm (with some of them also 
integrated into city-founding myths). Most of them embody the 
archetypal task motif: they are sent off on dangerous missions which 
are bound to finish them off. However, they prove their heroic 
potential and attain victories against all odds and are rewarded. 
On first observation, therefore, subjecting these narrative segments 
to the same kind of paradigmatic—and archetypal—reading appears 
more than tempting. Indeed, some of these paradigms are implicated 
in a special kind of intertextual linkage within the mythological realm: 
the story of Perseus, for instance, may be read as a prevision of Saint 
George's slaying of the dragon. 
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Yet the myths these similar segments are torn from have very 
different endings and they point to different interpretive options. Of 
the mythological heroes mentioned above, only two attain a blissful 
final end. Heracles is received into Olympus as the son of Zeus; 
Perseus and Andromeda, Ovid reports, live happily ever after. The 
other four are not so lucky. Unmerited suffering plagues the House of 
Cadmus, and Cadmus himself is trapped in a pattern that brings him 
an end which turns out to be far from heroic: he is changed into a 
snake before dying. Oedipus blinds himself and goes into exile. 
Bellerophon dies lame and cursed by the gods for his hubris and 
presumption. St. George's subsequent life brings him much suffering 
and he dies a martyr's death; the reward is spiritual. 
Most of these mythological personages are by now safely 
embalmed in primordial configurations and they have served as 
original models for countless analogous incarnations in the subsequent 
evolution of culture, including the literary culture. The exemplary 
stories in which they figure have spawned a vast array of archetypal 
and paradigmatic alternatives, thus generating a whole spate of close 
cousins in the literatures of the past centuries. The archetypal career of 
the hero has thus become a formal pattern historically abstracted from 
the life cycles of mythological prototypes such as Perseus, 
Bellerophon. Heracles, Jason, Theseus, Meleager, Orpheus, 
Prometheus, Moses, etc. and has come to serve as a congenial nodal 
point and time-embalmed receptacle. As such, the paradigm of the 
hero has become ready to accommodate subsequent archetypal 
characters, also displaying in the process a gradual shift from the 
purely mythological to the literary, including, more recently, a new 
gallery of protagonists in popular culture. This metamorphic transition 
can be well traced even in a loose and skeletal sequence ranging from 
Achilles and Aeneas via Beowulf, Arthur and Roland to Hamlet and 
ivanhoe down to the "superheroes" of contemporary, often escapist, 
mass culture. As regards this last, popular cultural, stage within the 
American frame of reference, it will be instructive to quote from the 
blurb of Jewett and Lawrence's monographic study on the American 
monomyth: 
The Amer ican m o n o m y t h finds Captain Kirk and Mr. Spöck of "Star 
T r e k " saving var ious stellar communi t i es f rom horrible dangers. 
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Superman is perpetually rescuing Metropolis, U.S.A. Buf fa lo Bill 
relieves the frontier territory of the Wild West of its threat f rom 
aggressive savages. Chief Brody in Jaws comes from obscurity to 
save Amity Island f rom the shark. Paul Kersey in Death Wish and 
Bufford Pusser in Walking Tall become archetypal superheroes 
singlehandedly purging evil in contemporary America. 
In the foreword to the same volume, sci-fi author Isaac Asimov 
linked the American monomyth to a classical model, the Greek myth 
of Heracles, offering the following comment to justify the correlation: 
Heracles just happened by," he came from nowhere. With no thought 
of personal gain, he made the cause of sympathy and just ice his 
own, , fought the villain, rescued the fair maid, and restored the 
happiness of the King. Then, scarcely pausing for thanks, he 
vanished into nowhere, (xiv) 
This is a somewhat subjective explanation, and the points of 
similarity cited would more appropriately describe the Lone Ranger 
than Heracles. The nature of the justification is, however, 
symptomatic, and it also problematizes some of the potential 
advantages and inherent limitations of analogous transactions in 
intertextual relationships, the central theme of the present discussion. 
Before passing to my main theme, however, it should be pointed 
out that capitalizing on the accumulated results of extensive studies in 
Stoff geschlichte, littérature comparée, Gestalt, folklore research, 
character typology, comparative anthropology, Joseph Campbell's 
global synthesis, or of a kind of vague and incidental critical fertility, 
myth-and-literature studies have churned out—and its representative 
texts are chock-full of—an awesome collection of archetypal 
characters. Just to cite some of the well-rehearsed configurations, 
besides the hero archetype we have by now separate niches for 
antiheroes (formerly the hero's hostile opponents; in more recent texts 
the bungler, the loser, for instance the schlemiel), the Jungian wise 
fool (the jester, Prince Myshkin), the devil figure (Satan, Faustus, 
Hawthorne's Rappaccini), the outcast (Cain, lshmael, the Wandering 
Jew, the Flying Dutchman, Ethan Brand), the double (Poe's William 
Wilson. Jekyll and Hyde, the Karamazov brothers, Jókay's Baradlay 
brothers), the scapegoat (Adonis, Christ, Hester Prynne, Major 
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Molineux),1 the temptress (Helen of Troy, Circe, Cleopatra, Delilah, 
Malamud's Memo in The Natural), the trickster (Odysseus, Til 
Eulenspiegel, Falstaff, Iago, Melville's confidence man, Flannery 
O'Connor 's Bible salesman in "Good Country People"), etc. 
In these formal abstractions the mythical prototype, whenever there is 
one, is most often regarded as the ur-character, and the same mechanism 
appears to apply to other well-rehearsed paradigms, such as the fertility 
myth (where the most commonly accepted fathering text is the Egyptian 
myth of Osiris, Set and Horus), the creation myth (as exemplified, for 
instance, in the ancient Babylonian myth involving Tiamat and Marduk), 
the myth of deliverance (e.g. the Biblical paradigm involving the ancient 
Hebrews, the saving acts of Yahweh, and Moses leading his people to 
freedom through the Red Sea), the Sky Father*-*Earth Mother 
dichotomy (as in the first two chapters of Genesis, a larger number of 
other creation myths, Ovid's "The Four Ages," John Barth's "Night-Sea 
Journey"), death and rebirth (Ovid's story of Orpheus and Eurydice, the 
Biblical story of Lazarus in John's chapter 11, D. H. Lawrence's 
"Snake,"), mating with a mortal (Ovid's story of Europa in the second 
book of Metamorphoses, the legend of Leda and the Swan), the search 
for the father (from the story of Telemachus in Homer's The Odyssey 
through Sylvia Plath's "Daddy"), the journey and the quest (the Biblical 
story of the Exodus via Allen Tate's "The Mediterranean" through 
James Joyce's "An Encounter"), the task (the exploits of Jason, the 
Biblical story of Jacob serving Laban for Rachel and Leah, Arthur 
pulling out Excalibur embedded in stone, Malamud's "The First Seven 
Years"), the contest motif (David versus Goliath, Hector and Achilles, 
Dimmesdale and Chillingworth, Bartleby and the lawyer), the fall from 
innocence to experience (the fall of Adam and Eve, Henry Fleming in 
Stephen Crane's The Red Badge of Courage), the initiation stage of 
becoming (the Biblical prodigal son, Hawthorne's "Young Goodman 
Brown," Twain's Huckleberry Finn, Crane's Fleming, Hemingway's 
Nick Adams, Ellison's nameless-invisible protagonist). Depending on 
1
 "To restore life to its first vigor," Vickery argues, "one must expel from the community 
all evils, afflictions, and sorrows together with those demons, ghosts, witches, and spirits 
of the dead which give rise to them. From individual attempts to remove personal woes 
there gradually developed communal endeavors to eradicate the afflictions of an entire 
people or nation" (The Literary Impact of The Golden Bough 60). 
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the ingenuity of the critic, comparative anthropologist, etc. the list can be 
continued indefinitely: the triumph of the underdog, the opposable self, 
the glamorized misfit, one against the many, the pariah/savior, the 
rebel/victim, etc. 
Despite the profusion of these abstracted clichés, there is no 
definitive list of canonized archetypes, and neither is there a working 
agreement as to how a thematic cliché or other abstracted formula can 
make it onto the approved list. Some of the paradigmatic configurations 
are usually grouped, for convenience, in large thematic clusters such as 
the cycle of life sequence or designated simply as "archetypal 
situations." George Polti, J. Matthews reports, classified all story 
patterns into thirty-six dramatic situations, which he viewed as 
archetypes (2). The number of discrete items in the Thompson-Aarne 
motif-index runs into the thousands. At the other end of the spectrum, 
through his universalizing monomythic construct, Joseph Campbell— 
organizing in terms of the entire earth—attempted to prove in effect that 
all the stories of the world are really one story. 
As we have seen in our first example, the similarities and differences 
inherent in the various incarnations of the myth of the hero in 
mythological narratives in which the particular heroic careers are 
couched exemplify special issues and problems pertaining to analogy, 
the intertextual networking of apparently diverse or allegedly kindred 
plots, and the justification of a paradigmatic reading of texts, either 
myth(olog)ical or literary. These uncertainties may become especially 
acute in myth critical transactions premised on the alleged intertextual 
validity of diverse prefigurative correlations, where the temptation to 
treat loose analogy as identity' can be especially strong, not to mention 
conative impulses in assigning attributes and significances to things not 
otherwise significant. 
In myth-and-literature transactions the triggering agent is analogy, 
which, by definition, is bound to operate within an intertextual 
networking of texts." Intertextuality (and its satellites: interdependence, 
interlink, influence, the ad infinitum 'kplay of texts," source, residue, etc.) 
and analogy (together with its satellites: resemblance, sameness, 
difference, archetype, paradigm, anomaly, etc.) are interrelated within 
~ Indeed. I regard all mylh(olog)ical correlations as manifestations of "mandatory" 
intertextuality. 
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the same cluster of networking. To see how these latent correspondences 
are triggered to generate linkage and added meaning, it is necessary to 
realize that these transactions operate within a structural scheme, which I 
will call triangulation and which will be used here to describe a special 
relationship between two given intertexts as fixed points connected to 
the cultural consumer (reader, critic, interpreter, etc.) who actually 
generates the interlink. Indeed, without the human subject as a 
perceiving and connecting agent, interlinks are merely latent and 
dormant possibilities. Which also means that in these transactions the 
"anxiety of influence" ä la Harold Bloom is a perennial factor 
implicating both author and myth critic, also involving—less directly— 
the reader. In its larger ramifications of historicity, the very under-
standing of the myth-and-literature dynamic, which operates within a 
special process of give-and-take, that is, through the dialectic of 
continuities and disruptions, is inconceivable outside the intertextual 
dialogue of texts. Again, in a looser sense, the very idea of how 
tradition—including the legacy of myth—coalesces and is maintained is 
fundamentally intertextual. 
The demonstration of how the lineage of a given corpus is 
established, how potential "fathering texts" can be located, and how, in 
establishing a context or frame of possible linkage, the binding element 
can be found in structural conventions, culturally related patterns of 
conduct, or some other constructs of cultural continuity would be the 
logical extension of the present inquiry. Owing to limitations of space, 
however, this demonstration will not be elaborated here. Suffice it to say 
that between two artifacts—thus between texts of ancient myth and 
subsequent literary works—almost anything can trigger intertextual 
linkage: a structural device, a plot segment, a literary figure, a character 
trait, a narrative element, a stylistic feature, a cliché. This last element, 
the cliché, is an especially potent generator of resemblances, particularly 
if the concept is meant in a structural or thematic sense. Cliché can thus 
be a synonym for a formal-thematic device of almost any order of 
magnitude, or it can simply stand for a platitude, a thematic concept, an 
instance of objectified ethos, a commonplace idea, a simple truth, a fact 
of life. Emily Dickinson, for instance, wrote 1775 poems, while 
refreshing a mere handful of conventional thematic clichés. 
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The problem of generating knowledge indirectly through analogy, 
together with the complex issues of reception and the recipient's 
freedom to be guided by his or her own preference models of 
interpretation is one of the twilight zones of literary aesthetic, riddled 
with parameters and paradoxes that are likely to be both subjectivized 
and epistemologically "soft." The complex of likeness, criteria of 
similarity, partial identity, and the nature of conditioning by the 
historically changing dynamic in the acceptance of paradigmatic 
readings was interestingly described in the preface of E. M. Moseley's 
study of the Christ archetype: 
I was particularly interested in the Christ archetype in a series of 
novels quite dissimilar on the surface but basically alike in what 
they had to say. As I deliberately considered these similarities which 
I had more or less intuitively discovered, I came to realize that the 
important point was not so much how these works were alike as how 
they were different while being alike. My main interest became the 
variations on the same pattern, variations which I soon related to the 
changing climate of opinion almost f rom decade to decade. It is 
amazing that attitudes and emphases change so rapidly in our time! 
(vii-viii) 
One of the ramifications that is essential to perceive at this point is 
that in myth-and-literature transactions it is highly questionable to accept 
the dubious structuralist or poststructuralist premise that there is 
"nothing outside the text." The epistemological rationale for intertextual 
linkage is not an impersonal unfolding and recombination of a priori 
and dormant correspondences. Their appearance in the text is a 
concentrated manifestation of what they represent in the first place, thus 
it is impossible to abolish the reality behind the text. Doing so, to 
paraphrase Colin Falck's relevant statement, would be rather like talking 
about a ballgame without ever actually mentioning the ball.3 This is one 
"The linguistic theories of Saussure and his successors are undeniably based on a correct 
recognition that 'correspondence,' or 'thing-and-name,' theories of linguistic meaning are 
philosophically indefensible. But these structuralist and post-structuralist theories seem 
themselves no less undeniably to be false in so far as they claim that linguistic meanings 
are a matter only of the relationships which hold between linguistic terms themselves, 
and that there is therefore, in some (admittedly rather special or arcane) philosophical 
sense, 'nothing outside the text.' The structuralist or post-structuralist tradition of 
linguistic—and therefore also literary—meaning in effect abolishes reality. To try to talk 
about literature in the language of structuralist or post-structuralist theory can seem rather 
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side of the coin. The other is the above-mentioned triangulation process 
of how intertextual linkage is generated: the oscillation between poles of 
similarity, partial identity, anomaly, etc. is grasped and sorted out by the 
externally situated, "extratextual" observer, i.e., the reader, the critic, the 
cultural consumer whose main epistemological tool in generating 
meaning is analogical reasoning, which in turn can be both "correct" and 
"incorrect," likely to be tinged by conative impulses or the simple desire 
to find meaning that appears to be coherent or simply "satisfying." 
Hence the enormous creative, but also abusive, potential of analogous 
combinatory operations. 
Thus, analogy, because it is a form of generating indirect knowledge, 
has privileged epistemological potentials as a tool of choice between 
rival forms, and also as the structural means of setting up and operating 
paradigms. It is not by accident that the doctrine of analogy has been a 
privileged form of cognition and rhetoric in religious dogma for 
centuries. Neither should it be surprising—although this is almost 
always ignored—that the creative and enriching potentials of analogy 
and paradigmatic operations provide the rationale for most intertextual 
claims. 
And hence the enormous responsibility of the "extratextual" 
perceiver who wields the instrument of analogy as a tool of choice 
between rival forms. Pinpointing the excesses of compulsive symbol 
seeking and deep reading has generated a minor industry in what J. C. 
Furnas has identified as "academic busywork" (520) and what I 
elsewhere called "interpretive overkill" (Virágos). It is partly 
understandable that the joy of discovery may prove difficult to contain 
when the myth critic is involved in practising a strategy of interpretation 
which is virtually foolproof. "This strategy," Meyer H. Abrams has 
observed, "to be sure, has a single virtue: it cannot fail" (50). The 
temptation to offer pregnant surmises and to stimulate new growth of 
meaning through manipulating the pretentious metaphor, to isolate a 
pervasive archetype from unintentional myths at the expense of blurring 
like trying to talk about a game of soccer or baseball without ever actually being allowed 
to mention the ball" (Falck xii). 
4
 It might also be useful to consider the theoretical ramifications of the following statement: 
"Paradoxical as it may seem, paradigms ... make all forms of creativity possible" (Curtis 
viii). 
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the actual nature of the text in question is often too strong to resist. It is 
especially so in the case of large, all-emcompassing paradigms and 
monomythic abstractions such as the quest-myth. More than three 
decades ago, G. Hough complained of the one-dimensional practice in 
myth criticism of seeing characters and events 
as symbol iza t ions of archaic, otherwise inarticulate responses to 
certain archetypal situations. [...] Characters in fictional works cease 
to be "just representat ions of nature" and become embod imen t s of a 
few mythical constants. Any young man who dies becomes a dy ing 
god, related to Attis, Adonis and Osiris. Any girl who is carried off 
and comes back again becomes Persephone; and any heroine who is 
badly treated by one character and rescued by another becomes 
Andromeda . Anybody who goes looking for anything becomes a 
participant in the "ques t -myth ." (142 -43 ) 
In a review of John Vickery's Myth and Literature T. H. Gaster talks 
about 
the crucial error of assuming that there are certain basic 
situations which belong primarily to the realm of myth and 
ritual, so that when they appear in literature they must be thence 
derived. [...] Are we to say, for example, that a trip on the 
subway during the rush hour consciously imitates the archetypal 
myth of the journey to the netherworld or the perilous ordeal of 
the initiant? Or is a rape in Central Park an enactment of the 
Sacred Marriage? No; all that the mytho-critics are really saying, 
when you boil it down, is that myth, ritual, and literature deal 
with the same kinds of human situations. Which is scarcely 
worth saying. (28-29) 
In other words, one should be aware of the fact that the system may 
"leak." Very often, however, especially in myth critical studies, it is 
precisely the potential leakage that is creatively exploited. Because 
analogies are adaptable to diverse contexts and because arbitrary and 
determined features can be equally absorbed in these operations, 
normative applications can often create distortions, down to the point 
where analogy even becomes indistinguishable from anomaly, a case of 
obvious deviation from type. And it should be borne in mind that 
besides being external and elusive, analogies are suggestive and optive, 
rather than probative, and that paradigms do not create uniform, 
repeatable instances of anything (Curtis viii). 
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In intertextual correlations, therefore, these linkages will almost 
always lead to only partial revelations,5 which in turn can be rhetorically 
manipulated and offered in critical strategies as fully substantiated. 
Which also means that an indeterminate number of analogies and 
paradigmatic claims is bound to possess the attributes of selective 
validity. To the question "is a lion like a snake?" one can legitimately 
respond both in the negative and in the affirmative. All depends on [1] 
whether the chosen criterion of comparison is relevant in the sense that it 
can be objectively corroborated in the given context; or, [2], on the 
subjective—and conative—level, whether the initiator of such a 
preference model can find "adherents" to the proposition, i.e., people 
sufficiently willing to accept the given criterion as relevant. 
Moreover, the dilemma inherent in the acceptance or rejection of 
analogous propositions has been further compounded by how we 
interpret two of the prime tenets of postmodern criticism, namely that 
[1] no text has intrinsic value, and that [2] the cultural consumer, let us 
say the ideal or hypothetical—i.e., the mentally alert and culturally 
prepared—reader/interpreter, is far more important than the generator of 
primary texts. Should we also indiscriminately accept the corollary 
conclusion that "works of commentary" must now be valued as much, if 
not more, than "works of art" (qtd. in D'Souza 180) as a general 
blueprint, we may easily find ourselves in critical deep waters for the 
simple reason that it may become more than problematic to sort out 
valid and invalid propositions. We may thus ponder the usefulness of 
freewheeling associations where, for example, Rostand's Cyrano and 
Rudolph the reindeer turn out to be, in the critic's fertile moment of 
epiphany, the incarnations of one and the same archetype. Bert O. States 
of the University of California is invited to testify: 
Some years ago 1 had a characteristic "myth ic" exper ience. [...] I 
was rereading Cyrano de Bergerac, and it suddenly d a w n e d on me 
that I knew this plot f r o m another source. Here, it seemed to me, 
were the basic ingredients of the myth of Philoctetes, the Greek 
warr ior who was exi led f rom the Troy-bound army because of an 
o f fens ive wound, f...] Fol lowing the experience, I began seeing 
Philoctetes everywhere : in all those tales, for example , which center 
about ugly people, or ducklings, who are discovered to have 
" "As anyone knows who has worked with analogies, correspondences are elusive and 
often lead to only partial revelat ion" (Abrahams 154). 
286 
beautiful souls and in that broad class of fairy tales and novellas in 
which frogs are converted to princes and kitchen maids are 
discovered to be of royal birth or, by virtue of their undeserved 
hardships, to have attracted the patronage of fairy godmothers : 
moreover , are not many stories of overcompensat ion based on jus t 
this principle of the gifted pariah: And what of the genre of the 
moral tale? Cons ider the story of Rudolph, that lovable Horat io 
Alger of the reindeer world, whose grotesque electronic nose saves 
Chris tmas by piloting Santa ' s sleigh through the foggy night. (334) 
The reader can draw their own conclusions. The fact remains that 
even conventional critical operations between selected intertexts are 
likely to produce a problematic residue of meanings and interpretive 
distortions: reductive categorization, redundant predictability, the 
misplacing of emphasis. And labeling: Captain Ahab is Satan: Updike's 
Peter is Prometheus; Steinbeck's Jim Casey is Jesus Christ. Gatsby is 
Attis; Gatsby is Phaethon. Or rather, he is Heathcliff. And so on and so 
forth. In these instances, like in hundreds of other demonstrated 
parallels, the few points of analogous traits are substantially outweighed 
by the undeniable differences. To use yet another intertextual example, 
in The Executioner's Song, as R. Schleifer has recently shown, Mailer 
rewrites a "fathering" text, Dreiser's An American Tragedy (227-41). 
The intertextual relation is sound in many respects, especially in terms of 
the two intertexts' thematic paradigm of crime and punishment in 
America but otherwise the essential difference between the works 
compared cannot be collapsed without violating the autonomy of the 
respective counterparts. 
How this is gauged and measured remains problematic, primarily 
because none of the antidotes which one is likely to conjure up off-
hand—common sense, sobriety, taste, credibility, etc.—is "objective." 
Analogical thinking raises apparently innocent questions that have 
been bothersome ever since the ancients. It is sobering to consider the 
fact, for instance, that there are no satisfying definitions and criteria of 
similarity or of partial identity that could be satisfactorily applied in 
criticism, not even foolproof ways of accounting for and recognizing 
the presence or absence of likeness. As D. Burrell stated in a study on 
the role of analogies in philosophical language, "there is no method 
for assuring proper analogous use" (242), and the claim is certainly 
descriptive of purposive critical strategies intent on generating 
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linkage. No amount of regulation could weed out the hazards that 
follow from the very nature and mechanics of these operations. The 
best a critic can hope for is being alert and aware of where leakage is 
likely to occur. 
WORKS CITED 
Abrahams, Roger. "Theory in Folk Studies." Midwest Folklore 10.3 
(1960): 152-154. 
Abrains, Meyer Howard. English Romantic Poets: Modern Essays in 
Criticism. London: Oxford UP, 1975. 
Burrell, David. Analogy and Philosophical Language. New Haven: 
Yale UP, 1973. 
Curtis, James M. Culture as Polyphony: An Essay on the Nature of 
Paradigms. Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1978. 
D'Souza, D. Illiberal Education. New York: Free P, 1991. 
Falck, Colin. Myth, Truth and Literature: Towards a True Post-
Modernism. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. 
Furnas, J. C. "The Crowded Raft: Huckleberry Finn & Its Critics." 
The American Scholar 54.4 (1985): 517-524. 
Gaster, Theodor H. "Prometheus and Persephone Reborn." Saturday 
Review 20 Aug. 1966: 28-29. 
Hough, Graham. An Essay on Criticism. New York: Norton, 1966. 
Jewett, Robert and John Shelton Lawrence. The American Monomyth. 
Lanham: UP of America, 1988. 
Lawrence, John Shelton and Robert Jewett, The Myth of the American 
Superhero. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002. 
Matthews, Jack. Introduction. Archetypal Themes in the Modern 
Story. Ed. J. Matthews, New York: St. Martin's P, 1973. 1-4. 
Moseley, Edwin M. Pseudonyms of Christ in the Modem Novel: 
Motifs and Methods. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1962. 
288 
Schleifer, Ronald. "American Violence: Dreiser, Mailer, and the 
Nature of Intertextuality." Intertextuality and Contemporary 
American Fiction. Ed. Patrick O1 Donneil and Robert Con Davis. 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1989. 227-241. 
States, Bert O. "The Persistence of the Archetype." Critical Inquiry 
7.2 (1980): 333-344. 
Vickery, John. The Literary Impact of the 'Golden Bough.' Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1973. 
Virágos, Zsolt. "The Hazards of Interpretive Overkill: The Myths of 
Gatsby." Hungarian Studies in English 12 (1991): 49-68. 
289 
